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ABSTRACT 
Panama’s former dictator, Manuel Noriega, recently sued 
Activision Blizzard in the California Superior Court for using his 
likeness and image in the popular video game “Call of Duty: 
Black Ops II.”  In his complaint, Noriega alleged that the use of 
his likeness violated his right of publicity. Former New York 
Mayor, Rudy Giuliani, came to Activision’s defense, and filed a 
motion to dismiss, which was granted.  In granting Activision’s 
motion, the court held that Activision’s use of Noriega’s likeness 
was transformative and did not violate his right of publicity.  
This Issue Brief argues that the California Superior Court 
should not have applied the transformative use test but should 
have held that Manuel Noriega did not have a right of publicity 
for his place in Panama’s history.  
INTRODUCTION 
 Call of Duty is Activision’s most popular videogame franchise.1 
It involves a series of “first person shooter” video games where players 
take control of a foot soldier in a simulated warfare experience.2  The 
first installments of the Call of Duty franchise took place during World 
War II and featured actual historical events.3  Some of the later 
installments contained fictional storylines and events, such as World War 
III.4 The Call of Duty: Black Ops storyline stretches over a long period of 
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1 Declaration of Daniel Suarez in Support of Defendant’s Special Motion to 
Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint Under the California Anti-SLAPP Statute at 2, CIV. 
PROC. CODE §§ 425.16–425.17, Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. 
BC551747 (Cal. Sup. Ct. L.A. County Oct. 16, 2014) [hereinafter “Suarez 
Declaration”]. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 5. 
4 Id. at 6. 
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time, starting in the Cold War and finishing in the future.5  The storyline 
also features several real-world historical figures and events.6   
 Manuel Noriega is depicted as himself in Call of Duty: Black 
Ops II.7 He is a non-player character (NPC), and appears in two missions 
during the 1980’s portion of the Black Ops II story line.8 He first appears 
in a cinematic, and then as the primary objective of a mission.9 There are 
similarities between the Manuel Noriega character in Black Ops II and 
the real-life Manuel Noriega.10 In fact, Activision created the Noriega 
character in Black Ops II by relying on “videos and stills from news 
coverage.”11 Anyone looking at a side-by-side comparison of the Manuel 
Noriega Black Ops II depiction and the real-life Manuel Noriega will see 
that the Black Ops II depiction has the same eye and hair color as the 
real-life Noriega, and a nearly identical facial structure and hairstyle.12 
Activision hired an actor to “provide voiceover and motion capture13 . . . 
for the Noriega character.”14  
 In 2014, Manuel Noriega sued Activision Blizzard for violating 
his right of publicity, by claiming that Activision had misappropriated 
his likeness and been unjustly enriched by using his likeness in order to 
increase sales of Black Ops II.15 Activision subsequently moved to 
dismiss Noriega’s claim under the California Anti-SLAPP (Strategic 
Lawsuits Against Public Participation) statute. Under this statute, causes 
of action that arise from the exercise of free speech under the United 
States Constitution or Constitution of California are “subject to a special 
                                                      
5 Id. at 7, 12. 
6 Id. at 7. Fidel Castro, John F. Kennedy, Robert McNamara and Manuel 
Noriega are just some of the historical figures featured in the Call of Duty: Black 
Ops series. Id. at 4, 7.  
7 Id. at 15. 
8 Id. at 4, 11, 16–17. 
9 Id. at 16. 
10 Id. at 18. 
11 Id. 
12 See id. The photos on page 18 show a side-by-side comparison of the Black 
Ops II Noriega and the real-life Noriega. 
13 Motion capture is the process by which “the complex motion of [a 
performer’s] body (and face)” is transmitted “to an animated character.” Steve 
Dent, What You Need to Know About Motion Capture, ENGAGDET (July 14th, 
2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.engadget.com/2014/07/14/motion-capture-
explainer/. 
14 Suarez Declaration, supra note 1, at 18. 
15 Complaint at 2, Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747 (Cal. 
Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, July 15, 2014)) [hereinafter “Noriega 
Complaint”].  
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motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has 
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the 
claim.”16 The Court granted Activision’s anti-SLAPP motion and 
concluded that Activision was protected under the First Amendment.17 
 Part I of this Issue Brief will discuss the district court’s decision, 
the legal framework underlying a theory of publicity claim, and the 
transformative use defense. Part II will analyze the district court’s 
decision and argue that the district court should have held that Manuel 
Noriega did not have a right of publicity for his place in Panama’s 
history, instead of applying the transformative use test.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The California Anti-SLAPP Statute 
 The Anti-SLAPP statute is designed to reduce the number of 
lawsuits “brought primarily to chill valid exercise of the constitutional 
right[] of freedom of speech.”18 Courts use a two step-process in 
determining whether an Anti-SLAPP motion should be granted.19 First, 
“the defendant must make a threshold showing that the challenged cause 
of action arises from protected activity.”20 Once this showing is made the 
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that there is a probability that he 
will prevail on the merits of the claim.21 To determine whether the 
plaintiff has adequately demonstrated a probability of prevailing, the trial 
“court does not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations,” 
and must consider any Constitutional defense, such as a First 
Amendment freedom of speech defense.22 The court assumes that the 
plaintiff’s allegations are true and must grant the motion if the plaintiff 
fails to show a probability of prevailing, or if there is a valid 
Constitutional defense.23   
 
 
                                                      
16 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2014). 
17 Order Dismissing Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike at 4, Noriega v. 
Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, 
Oct. 27, 2014), 2014 WL 5930149, at *4. 
18 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §425.16(a)). 
19 No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 403 (Ct. App. 
2011). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 404 (quoting Ross v. Kish, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 484, 491 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
23 See id. 
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B. The Common Law Right of Publicity 
 Under the common law right of publicity, a public figure may 
bring an “invasion of privacy tort” when his likeness is commercially 
exploited.24 In order to prevail on a right of publicity claim, the plaintiff 
must show that his likeness has been appropriated and commercially 
exploited to the defendant’s advantage.25 The California Civil Code 
contains a provision for bringing claims similar to the common law right 
of publicity, but has one additional element.26 Under California law, the 
defendant must know that he is appropriating the public figure’s 
likeness.27 “The misappropriation of likeness refers to a person’s visual 
image.”28 
 The right of publicity was created in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co.,29 where the Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment does not protect infringements on the right of publicity.30 In 
Zacchini, the plaintiff performed a “human cannonball” act, where he 
was shot out of a cannon, flew in the air for two hundred feet, and landed 
in a net.31 He performed at fairs, where members of the public, who had 
paid to enter, were not charged an additional fee to watch his act.32 A 
free-lance reporter, employed by the defendant broadcasting company, 
attended the fair and taped the entire act, despite the plaintiff’s request 
that the act not be taped.33 The act was then broadcasted on the 11 
o’clock news.34 After his act was broadcasted, the “human cannonball” 
sued the defendant broadcasting company claiming, among other things, 
that the defendant had “unlawf[ully] appropriate[ed] [his] professional 
property.”35 The defendant broadcasting company responded by arguing 
that broadcasting the plaintiff’s act was protected under the First 
Amendment.36 
                                                      
24 Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 612 (Ct. App. 2006). 
25 Id. 
26 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2014). 
27 Id. 
28 Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 613 (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 
463 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
29 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
30 Id. at 578–79. 
31 Id. at 563. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 563–64. 
34 Id. at 564. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
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 In deciding whether the defendant was protected under the First 
Amendment, the Court considered the state’s interest in prohibiting the 
appropriation of a celebrity’s likeness without his consent. The Court 
ultimately held that the state had an interest “in protecting the propriety 
interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such 
entertainment.”37 
 The Court compared the broadcasting of the human cannonball’s 
act to copyright infringement, and was concerned that the broadcasting 
company had posed a “substantial threat to the economic value of [the 
performance]” by showing the “human cannonball’s” act on the news.38 
The Court noted that, as in copyright, protecting a performer’s act would 
“provide[] an economic incentive for [the creator of the performance] to 
make the investment required to produce a performance of interest.”39 
 In a subsequent case, Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup 
Inc.,40 the California Supreme Court further discussed the right of 
publicity, after an artist, who sold t-shirts bearing literal depictions of the 
“Three Stooges,” was sued by the production company of the infamous 
trio.41 The company claimed that its right to publicity had been violated 
when the “Three Stooges” depiction was appropriated to the t-shirts.42 
 The court ruled in favor of the production company, holding that 
the “Three Stooges” had a right of publicity to depictions of their 
likeness.43 In coming to this conclusion the court found that the right of 
publicity protected a form of intellectual property that was the result of 
considerable labor.44 The following quotation captures the court’s 
reasoning: 
Often considerable money, time and energy are needed to develop 
one’s prominence in a particular field. Years of labor may be 
required before one’s skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are 
sufficiently developed to permit an economic return through some 
medium of commercial promotion. For some, the investment may 
eventually create considerable commercial value in one’s identity.45 
                                                      
37 Id. at 573. 
38 Id. at 575–76. 
39 Id. at 576. 
40 25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001). 
41 Id. at 393. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 409–10. 
44 Id. at 399. 
45 Id. at 399 (citations omitted) (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 
813, 834–35 (1979)). 
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 The court found that the “Three Stooges” had gone through a 
“long and arduous” journey to become famous and depictions of them 
“amounting to little more than the appropriation of [their] economic 
value [were] not protected under the First Amendment.”46 As a result of 
this reasoning, the court found that the literal depictions of the “Three 
Stooges” violated Comedy III’s right of publicity.47 
 Similarly, in Estate of Presley v. Russen, a distinction was drawn 
between the use of a character’s likeness for historical purposes and the 
exploitation of a character’s likeness for commercial purposes.48 In 
Estate of Presley, a production company that featured Elvis 
impersonators was sued by Elvis Presley’s heirs, under the theory that 
the impersonators were commercially exploiting Elvis’ fame.49 In 
holding for Presley’s heirs, the court concluded that portrayals of Elvis 
that served “the purpose of contributing information . . . to the public 
debate of political or social issues” would be immune from liability.50 
Portrayals of Elvis that “function[] primarily as a means of commercial 
exploitation,” however, would not be immune from liability.51 The court 
then applied a balancing test, which weighed the societal interests of free 
expression against Elvis’ heirs’ right to exploit his publicity.  The court 
concluded that the Elvis imitation provided limited social value because 
it did not contain “its own creative component.”52 However, the court did 
note that biographical films or plays depicting Elvis’ role in the history 
and development of Rock n’ Roll would not infringe on the heirs’ rights 
to exploit Elvis’ publicity.53 
 Then, in Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc.54 the Ninth Circuit delineated 
the interests that the right of publicity protects.55 Keller revolved around 
a right of publicity claim brought by National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) football players, against Electronic Arts (EA).56 
The players alleged that EA had misappropriated their likeness in EA’s 
NCAA Football video game series.57 EA argued that they were protected 
                                                      
46 Id. at 400. 
47 Id. at 409–10. 
48 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). 
49 See id. at 1344. 
50 Id. at 1356. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1359. 
53 Id. at 1360. 
54 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
55 Id. at 1281. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1269. 
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under the First Amendment because the NCAA Football games did not 
mislead consumers into believing that the players had endorsed EA or its 
products.58 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that “[t]he right of 
publicity protects the celebrity, not the consumer,” and that the players 
were entitled to compensation for appropriations of their likeness, when 
their celebrity status was earned through “talent and years of hard work 
on the football field.”59 
C. The Transformative Use Defense 
 Transformative use is an affirmative defense to a right of 
publicity claim.60 Under the transformative use defense, a defendant 
cannot be found liable for violating another’s right of publicity if “the 
product containing the celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has 
become . . . the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s 
likeness.”61 For instance, in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.,62 the 
California Supreme Court considered whether Kieran Kirby, the lead 
singer of a musical group, had a right of publicity claim against Sega, 
when Sega modeled a video game character, “Ulala,” after her.63 The 
court ultimately held that Sega’s use of Kirby’s likeness was protected 
under the transformative use test, because Sega’s depiction of Ulala was 
not a literal depiction of Kirby but rather a “transformative work.”64 
While the court noted several similarities between Ulala and Kirby, such 
as similarly shaped eyes; pink hair; and brightly colored shoes, the court 
found that Ulala was Sega’s own creative work.65 In coming to this 
conclusion the court noted that Ulala was not a literal depiction of Kirby, 
as she had a different physique, and that Ulala was a space age reporter, 
which was “unlike any public depiction of Kirby.”66  
                                                      
58 Id. at 1281. 
59 Id. 
60 See Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 
(Cal. 2001) (“[W]orks of parody or other distortions . . . do not generally 
threaten markets for celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed 
to protect.”).  
61 Id. at 809. 
62 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Ct. App. 2006). 
63 Id. at 51–52. 
64 Id. at 61. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 59. The Court also noted that there were significant differences in the 
dance moves that Ulala and Kirby performed; Ulala’s dance moves were short, 
with quick movements, which were unlike the movements Kirby had in her 
dance videos. Id. 
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 Contrast the result in Kirby to the case mentioned earlier, 
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup Inc,67 where the court 
concluded that t-shirts containing literal drawings of the Three Stooges 
were not protected under the transformative use test because the 
depictions were “subordinated to the overall goal of creating a 
conventional portrait of [the “Three Stooges” in order to] commercially 
exploit [their] fame.”68  
D. Historical Figures’ Right of Publicity for Their Place in History 
 In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions69 the California 
Supreme Court held that the right of publicity “cannot be inherited by 
descendents.”70 However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Bird provided 
insight into the First Amendment’s protection of the appropriation of 
public and historical figures: 
Contemporary events, symbols and people are regularly used in 
fictional works. Fictional writers may be able to more persuasively, 
or more accurately, express themselves by weaving into the tale 
persons or events familiar to their readers. The choice is theirs. No 
author should be forced into creating mythological worlds or 
characters wholly divorced from reality. The right to publicity 
derived from public prominence does not confer a shield to ward off 
caricatures, parody and satire. Rather, prominence invites creative 
comment. Surely, the range of free expression would be 
meaningfully reduced if prominent persons in the present and recent 
past were forbidden topics of imaginations of authors and fictions.71 
Justice Bird used this insight to conclude that historical figures do not 
have a right to publicity when their likeness is used in fictional works.72 
                                                      
67 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
68 Id. at 810. The court contrasted the depiction of the “Three Stooges” with 
Andy Warhol’s depictions of celebrities. The court noted that Warhol’s 
depiction would receive protection under the transformative use test because, 
because Warhol’s depictions went “beyond the commercial exploitation of 
celebrity images and became a form of ironic social comment on the 
dehumanization of [the] celebrity itself. Id. at 811. Andy Warhol’s portraits can 
be seen at Celebrity Portraits, THE ANDY WARHOL EXPERIENCE, 
http://puffin.creighton.edu/museums/archive/7_abarnett/page2.htm (last visited 
July 22, 2015). 
69 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979). 
70 Id. at 455. 
71 Id. at 460 (Bird, J., concurring). 
72 Id. 
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If it were otherwise “the creation of historical novels and other works 
inspired by actual events and people would be off limits to [authors].”73  
E. The District Court’s Decision 
 The district court granted Activision’s anti-SLAPP motion, 
concluding that Activision’s depiction of Noriega constituted 
Activision’s own artistic expression, therefore it was protected under the 
transformative use test.74  In its decision, the district court found it 
significant that Noriega was only featured in two of the game’s eleven 
missions and was “just one of more than 45 characters, including other 
historical figures, who appear in the game.”75 The court also found it 
significant that players could not “assume the Noriega character’s 
identity, control its movements, or experience game play through its 
eyes.”76 
II. ANALYSIS 
 While the district court was correct in granting the anti-SLAPP 
motion, it did so for the wrong reason. The district court grounded its 
decision based on the transformative use test, which is an affirmative 
defense to a right of publicity claim.77 However, Noriega does not have a 
right of publicity to depictions of his place in history to begin with. The 
court should have granted the anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that 
Noriega did not have a right of publicity on which to make a claim.  
A. Manuel Noriega Does Not Have a Right to Publicity for His 
Place in Panama’s History 
 Manuel Noriega does not have a right to publicity for his 
exploits as Panama’s dictator. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball78 
supports this position. In Gionfriddo, four professional baseball players 
sued the Major League Baseball Clubs (MLB) for including their 
statistics and names in “assorted All-Star game and World Series 
programs,”79 and for including videos and photographs of them in the 
“histories of major league baseball productions.”80 The court dismissed 
                                                      
73 Id. at 462. 
74 Order Dismissing Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike at 4, Noriega v. 
Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, 
Oct. 27, 2014), 2014 WL 5930149, at *4.  
75 Id. at 3. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 4. 
78 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
79 Id. at 311. 
80 Id. 
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the players’ claims and held that Major League Baseball could use 
photos, statistics and videos of these major league baseball players to 
“present[] historic events from long ago.”81 The court considered these to 
be “fragments from baseball’s mosaic,” or, in other words, pieces of 
baseball’s history protected under the First Amendment.82  
 In a similar case, Mickey Dora, whose “exploits in Malibu . . . 
are the folklore of [surfing],” sued Frontline video for creating a “video 
documentary entitled ‘The Legends of Malibu.’”83 Dora alleged that 
Frontline had used, without authorization, his name, voice, and likeness 
in the documentary.84 In dismissing Dora’s complaint, the court held that 
the documentary was a matter of public interest afforded First 
Amendment protection because it had social value in documenting “a 
certain time and place in California history and, indeed, in American 
Legend.”85 
 Estate of Presley v. Russen,86 also supports the conclusion that 
Manuel Noriega does not have a right of publicity for his place in 
Panama’s history. In Estate of Presley, the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey held that heirs of Elvis Presley had a right 
of publicity claim to shows that included Elvis impersonators.87  
However, the court differentiated between a biographical film or play of 
Elvis and an Elvis impersonator performing on a live stage.88 The court 
found that the biographical films and plays are immune from right of 
publicity claims because the public has an interest in “tracing the role of 
Elvis Presley in the development of rock “n roll.”89 
 Moreover, the policy reasons for giving celebrities right of 
publicity claims, do not apply to historical figures.90 Right of publicity 
claims protect a “form of intellectual property that society deems to have 
                                                      
81 Id. at 314. 
82 Id. 
83 Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 792. 
86 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). 
87 Id. at 1361. 
88 Id. at 1360. 
89 Id. 
90 See, e.g., Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 
808 (Cal. 2001) (stating that right of publicity claims protect a form of 
intellectual property); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1281 (9th Cir. 
2013) (explaining that professional football had right to publicity for years of 
hard work and talent needed to become a college athlete). 
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some social utility.”91 For example, the “human cannonball” had the 
right of publicity for his act, which was popular among crowds at the 
fair, and the Three Stooges had a right of publicity for appropriations of 
their likeness due to their notoriety as a comedy trio.92 Both the Three 
Stooges and the “human cannonball” had a right of publicity that derived 
from unique acts and years of labor. Appropriations of their likeness 
would allow third parties to benefit from their celebrity status, which in 
turn would reduce the economic value of the infamy that they earned 
through hard work and ingenuity.93 Similarly, athletes have a right to 
publicity due to their great talent, which is generally the result of years of 
hard work and dedication to a particular sport.94 Third parties who 
appropriate the likeness of athletes gain economic value from the 
athletes’ hard work and talent, without having to invest the time and 
energy needed to become skilled in a particular sport. 
 The policy implications under the right of publicity claims do not 
apply to Manuel Noriega. He is not famous for being an actor, 
professional athlete, or entertainer. His infamy is not based in any talent 
or unique act, but rather in his place in Panama’s history. In 1983, 
Manuel Noriega took control of the Panamanian army and engaged in 
“election fraud, drug trafficking, money laundering, and espionage 
against the United States.”95 Then in 1987 he declared a national 
emergency after a political opponent accused him of fixing the 1984 
elections and ordering the killing of a prominent figure that had accused 
him of drug trafficking.96 As part of his declaration of a national 
emergency, he “suspended constitutional rights, closed newspapers and 
radio stations, and drove his political enemies into exile.”97  In 1989 he 
declared an election void after the candidate he backed failed to win and 
instead installed a president of his choosing.98 In 1990 he was captured 
                                                      
91 Comedy III Productions, 21 P.3d at 804.  
92 See supra notes 31–47 and accompanying text. 
93 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977) 
(stating that broadcasting defendant’s act would cause significant economic 
damage to the value of his performance). 
94 See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1281 (stating that football player had to right to 
publicity for years of hard work and talent on football field). 
95 Manuel Noriega, THE ROBINSON LIBRARY (Feb. 18, 2015), 
http://www.robinsonlibrary.com/america/central/panama/noriega.htm. 
96 Manuel Noriega Biography, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD BIOGRAPHY, 
NOTABLEBIOGRAPHIES.COM (last visited July 22, 2015). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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after fleeing an armed conflict with the United States and surrendering to 
the Vatican Embassy in Panama City.99 
 Manuel Noriega is but a historical figure, whose infamy stems 
from these criminal acts.100 If Manuel Noriega had a right of publicity for 
his place in history, numerous other historical figures would have a right 
of publicity for scandalous or criminal conduct. Bill Clinton would have 
a right of publicity for depictions of his affair with Monica Lewinsky and 
James Holmes101 would have a right of publicity for depictions of the 
shooting that took place in an Aurora movie theater. This would be an 
untenable result as there is no societal interest in allowing historical 
figures who gained infamy from their place in history, to reap economic 
value that stems from their depictions. To the contrary, allowing 
historical figures to bring right of publicity claims for depictions of their 
place in history would preclude the media from depicting historical 
events, which would deprive the public access to historical re-
enactments. 
 Black Ops II includes depictions of Manuel Noriega in order to 
lend “authenticity” to its historical narrative.102 And, as Activision 
pointed out in its motion to dismiss, numerous historical works would be 
chilled if Noriega were to successfully use the “right to publicity to 
censor fictional accounts of [his] place in history.”103 Among these works 
are Ragtime,104 which features Harry Houdini, J.P. Morgan, Henry Ford, 
and Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and Midnight in Paris,105 featuring 
Ernest Hemingway and F. Scott Fitzgerald.106  
 Furthermore, the depiction of Noriega in Black Ops II is not like 
the depiction of the “human cannonball” in Zacchini.107 In Zacchini the 
plaintiff had created an act, the “human cannonball.” The Court found 
                                                      
99 Id. 
100 See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
101 James Holmes killed 12 people and wounded 58 people in 2012. Erica 
Goode, Serge F. Kovaleski, Jack Healy & Dan Frosch, Before Gunfire, Hints of 
‘Bad News’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, at A1. 
102 Suarez Declaration, supra note 1, at 15. 
103 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Special 
Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint under the California Anti-SLAPP Statute, 
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.16–425.16, Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. 
BC 551747, at 7–9 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Los Angeles County, July 15, 2014) 
[hereinafter “Anti-SLAPP motion”]. 
104 E.L. DOCTOROW, RAGTIME (1975). 
105 MIDNIGHT IN PARIS (Gravier Productions 2011). 
106 Anti-SLAPP motion, supra note 103, at 8–9. 
107 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
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that the defendant’s decision to film the “human cannonball” act went to 
the “heart of [the plaintiff’s] ability to earn a living as an entertainer.”108 
There is no such issue here. Manuel Noriega was a dictator of Panama, 
he was not an actor or athlete. The historical fact that he was a dictator is 
not commercially exploitable. Unlike the “human cannonball,” Noriega 
has not created anything. And unlike athletes, Noriega’s infamy did not 
arise from years of hard work and talent. Noriega’s place in Panama’s 
history does not belong to him any more than historical accounts and 
depictions belong to other historical figures. For instance, Richard Nixon 
does not own depictions of the Watergate scandal and George Bush does 
not own depictions of his presidency during the war with Iraq. To the 
contrary, just like the biographies and historical depictions of Elvis, 
depictions of Noriega belong to the public, which has an interest in his 
place in history.109  
B. The District Court Should Not Have Applied the Transformative 
Use Test in Dismissing Noriega’s Claim 
 The transformative use test is an affirmative defense to a right of 
publicity claim.110 Thus, the court implicitly recognized that Noriega had 
a right of publicity claim by holding that Blizzard’s use of Noriega’s 
likeness was “transformative” and thereby protected under the First 
Amendment. This is concerning because it opens the door for right of 
publicity claims by historical figures, as long as their depictions are not 
transformative. For instance, imagine a similar case where Noriega sues 
a movie company for producing a film that realistically depicts the 
events of his life. It is unlikely that such a movie would be protected by 
the transformative use test if it attempted to depict Noriega’s life as 
realistically as possible, and the economic value of the movie arose from 
Noriega’s fame.111 Similarly, Bill Clinton would have a right of publicity 
claim for depictions of his affair with Monica Lewinsky and George 
Bush would have right of publicity claims for depictions of him in his 
presidency. This would be an untenable result and contrary to the 
purpose behind right of publicity claims. Unfortunately, by applying the 
transformative use test, the district court’s holding has opened the door 
for historical figures to bring these right of publicity claims in the future. 
This sets a dangerous precedent. The district court could have avoided an 
                                                      
108 Id. at 576. 
109 See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1360 (D.N.J. 1981) 
(stating that biographical film of Elvis was in public interest of learning his 
place in the American Rock and Roll movement).  
110 Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 
2001). 
111 See id. at 810. 
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implicit recognition that these right of publicity claims are valid if it had 
dismissed Noriega’s claim on the ground that he did not have a right of 
publicity for his place in Panama’s history in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Superior Court of California correctly dismissed Noriega’s 
claim against Activision. However, it should have held that Noriega did 
not have a right of publicity for his place in history, rather than applying 
the transformative use test. The right of publicity only applies when the 
commercial exploitation of an individual’s likeness arises from his 
artistic labor. Noriega is not famous because he is an athlete, magician, 
singer, or any other type of artist. His infamy comes from his place in 
history as Panama’s former dictator.  
 By applying the transformative use test, the district court 
implicitly asserted that Noriega has a right of publicity for his place in 
history, which could have a chilling effect on the production of movies 
and other works of art featuring historical events. Moreover, the theory 
of publicity is based on the idea that an artist should have rights to profits 
from the appropriation of his likeness when his likeness has become 
economically valuable due to the fruits of his labor. There is no social 
value in allowing historical figures to bring right of publicity claims 
when they are depicted in their place in history. To the contrary, this 
would be detrimental to the public’s access to depictions of historically 
important events. 
  
 
 
 
